

1 Investment with adjustment costs and taxation²

Firm owns productive capital K_t that generates output $F(K_t)$ ($F_K > 0, F_{KK} \leq 0$) and evolves according to $K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t$. Output can be transformed into investment goods I_t one for one, but investment entails convex adjustment costs of $\Psi(I_t, K_t)$: $\Psi_I > 0, \Psi_{II} > 0, \Psi_K < 0, \Psi_{KK} > 0$ and $\Psi_I(\delta K, K) = 0$, i.e. marginal adjustment cost is zero when investment just replaces depreciating capital. One commonly used functional form is $\Psi(I, K) = \frac{p s i_0}{2K} (I - \delta K)^2$.

Corporate profits are subject to taxation characterized by the following rules:

- Operating profit is taxed at rate τ .
- Depreciation allowance. Capital expenditures can be deducted from taxable profit at depreciation schedule D_s , where $s = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ is the number of periods since the capital was installed. Assume that D_s follows a simple linear rule: every period a constant fraction δ of the *initial* value of capital can be deducted, i.e. for tax purposes capital fully depreciates after $1/\delta$ periods.
- Investment tax credit: A fraction κ of capital expenditures can be subtracted from the tax bill immediately.
- Assume that the above rules symmetrically apply if before-tax profit is negative, in which case firm gets a refund.

Firm starts with initial level of capital K_0 and is choosing optimal investment policy to maximize present value of after-tax profits, discounted at interest rate r , $V(K_0)$.

1. Formulate firm's decision problem. Pay attention to all the tax rules.

$$V(K_0) = \max_{\{I_t, K_{t+1}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t} \left[(1-\tau)(F(K_t) - \Psi(I_t, K_t)) - (1-\kappa)I_t + \tau \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} D_s I_{t-s} \right]$$

s.t. $K_{t+1} = (1-\delta)K_t + I_t$

2. Denote the shadow value of capital by q_t . Write down the Lagrangian and characterize firm's optimal investment policy.

We can rearrange summation as

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t} \tau \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} D_s I_{t-s} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} z I_t + A_0,$$

where $z = \tau \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \frac{D_s}{(1+r)^s}$ and $A_0 = \tau \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t} \tau \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} D_{-1-s} I_{-1-s}$. Note that A_0 is predetermined when decision is made at $t = 0$.

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²Adapted from Hayashi (1982) "Tobin's marginal q and average q: a neoclassical interpretation", *Econometrica*.

Rewrite the problem as

$$V(K_0) = \max_{\{I_t, K_{t+1}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t} [(1-\tau)(F(K_t) - \Psi(I_t, K_t)) - (1-\kappa-z)I_t] + A_0$$

s.t. $K_{t+1} = (1-\delta)K_t + I_t$

Lagrangian:

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r)^t} [(1-\tau)(F(K_t) - \Psi(I_t, K_t)) - (1-\kappa-z)I_t + q_t((1-\delta)K_t + I_t - K_{t+1})] + A_0$$

Taking first order conditions

$$\begin{aligned} [I_t] : q_t - (1-\kappa-z) &= (1-\tau)\Psi_I(I_t, K_t) \\ [K_{t+1}] : (1+r)q_t &= (1-\tau)(F_K(K_{t+1}) - \Psi_K(I_{t+1}, K_{t+1})) + q_{t+1}(1-\delta) \end{aligned}$$

FOC in $[I_t]$ can be used to solve for optimal I_t as a function of current K_t and q_t .

3. Assume that firm starts at the steady state. Use phase diagram to describe firm behavior after an unanticipated policy change that allows to depreciate capital for tax purposes at a faster rate $\hat{\delta} > \delta$ (depreciation rule is still linear, and physical depreciation is not affected).

We will be building phase diagram in (K_t, q_t) space.

Rewrite FOCs as

$$\begin{aligned} K_{t+1} - K_t &= \Psi_I^{-1}\left(\frac{q_t - (1-\kappa-z)}{1-\tau}, K_t\right) - \delta K_t \\ q_{t+1} - q_t &= \delta q_{t+1} + r q_t - (1-\tau)(F_K(K_{t+1}) - \Psi_K(I_{t+1}, K_{t+1})) \end{aligned}$$

The expression for the $\Delta K = 0$ isocline is simply a horizontal line $q_t = 1-\kappa-z$ because by assumption $\Psi_I(\delta K, K) = 0$. Ψ_I is increasing in first argument since $\Psi_{II} > 0$, so Ψ_I^{-1} is increasing too. Then if q_t is above $\Delta K = 0$ line $K_{t+1} - K_t > 0$, and below the line $K_{t+1} - K_t < 0$.

The expression for the $\Delta q = 0$ isocline is $q_t = \frac{1}{\delta+r}(1-\tau)(F_K(K_{t+1}) - \Psi_K(I_{t+1}, K_{t+1}))$. It is a downward sloping line because by assumptions $F_{KK} \leq 0$ and $\Psi_{KK} > 0$. When q_t and K_t are big $q_{t+1} - q_t > 0$, and below the line $q_{t+1} - q_t < 0$.

Remember expression for present value of depreciation allowances: $z = \tau \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \frac{D_s}{(1+r)^s}$. If D_s for smaller capital age s becomes larger, z increases.

Dynamics of the system after the shock is shown in Figure 1. q_t immediately jumps down to the new saddle path, and system gradually converges to the new steady state with higher level of capital.

4. (Hayashi theorem). Show that if $F(K)$ and $\Psi(I, K)$ are linearly homogenous, then Tobin's marginal q and average $Q \equiv V/K$ are related as $q = Q + \hat{A}$, where \hat{A} is a constant.

Rewrite the FOC in $[K_{t+1}]$ multiplied by K_{t+1} :

5. Describe a way to test the model with a simple OLS regression if you observed K_t, I_t and market value of firms. What would happen if you didn't include taxation rules into the model, or if assumptions of part 4 did not hold?

Let the adjustment cost function take the form $\Psi(I, K) = \frac{\psi_0}{2K}(I - \delta K)^2$. The the FOC in $[I_t]$ becomes

$$(1 - \tau)\psi_0\left(\frac{I_t}{K_t} - \delta\right) = q_t - (1 - \kappa - z)$$

Rearrange to get a regression equation:

$$\frac{I_t}{K_t} = \delta + \frac{1}{\psi_0}\tilde{q}_t,$$

where $\tilde{q}_t = \frac{q_t - (1 - \kappa - z)}{(1 - \tau)}$. Applying Hayashi theorem, q_t is estimated as $q_t = Q_t + A_t/K_t$, where $Q_t \equiv \frac{V_t}{K_t}$ is the Tobin's average q.

If one simply used an OLS regression to estimate

$$\frac{I_t}{K_t} = \delta + \frac{1}{\psi_0}Q_t,$$

estimates would be biased as $Q_t \neq q_t$.